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ARE WE DEFENDED? 
CONFLICTING REPRESENTATIONS OF WAR IN PRE-WAR FRANCE 
 
Lindsey Dodd 
Department of French Studies, University of Reading
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ABSTRACT 
This article examines contradictions in the way that war was represented to the French population in 
the interwar period. It argues that an ‘official’ representation of war gave an impression of France as a 
secure nation; people were discouraged from questioning the dominant military doctrine of defensive 
warfare, and were denied access to information to stifle potential criticism. ‘Unofficial’ 
representations, on the other hand, combined to create an image of a country whose security was 
increasingly threatened, particularly by a powerful eastern neighbour. During the 1930s, a feeling of 
imminent catastrophe was in the air, not only as a result of representations of war in film, press and 
advertising, but also fuelled by the ‘official’ literature of civil defence. The article draws on archival 
material from the towns of Boulogne-Billancourt and Brest to show that conflicting representations of 
war led to such confusion when war broke out in 1939 that people were unprepared, psychologically 
and physically, despite a near obsession with war over the past twenty years. Further, the strength of 
the representation of war as imminent catastrophe contributed to the state of mind which caused 
between eight and ten million citizens to flee the invading German army in panic in the summer of 
1940. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1939 Sommes-nous défendus? (‘Are we defended?’, 1938) won the French national prize 
for documentary films. It opens on a map of France, followed by an aerial view of a village; a 
peasant padlocks his gate, doors close, shutters are drawn, keys turned; storm clouds gather 
and a hen leads her chicks to shelter. As the opening sequence ends, the voiceover assures the 
audience: ‘France can shut its doors and shoot the bolts.’2 The film’s message is clear: France 
is defended by a strong and capable army, and there is nothing to fear from war. In the same 
year, Le jour se lève (‘Daybreak’) and Le règle du jeu (‘The Rules of the Game’) were 
released. Both echoed the increasingly sombre mood of the late 1930s, telling stories of defeat 
and social collapse. Neither was a box-office success. Early in 1939, France seemed happier 
to accept a vision of the world in which safety was assured. 
Yet the image of France as strong and well defended was just one of many representations 
of war which confronted the population. This article explores the contradictions within these 
representations which created confusion and fear, particularly as the expectation of war grew. 
It will argue that conflicting representations of war led to a paralysis in the preparation of 
defence for war and contributed to the panicked reaction of between eight and ten million 
French people who fled the invading German army in summer 1940. The article makes use of 
archival sources from the Parisian suburb of Boulogne-Billancourt, home of the main Renault 
factory, and from the Breton naval port of Brest.
3
 The representations of war it will consider 
are taken from film, newsreel, press, advertising and the literature of civil defence. Beginning 
with representations of past war, the article then looks at two conflicting representations of 
future war: the ‘official’ representation of future war as defence, as evoked by Sommes-nous 
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défendus? and the ‘unofficial’ view, that of war as imminent catastrophe. It concludes with a 
discussion of the contradictory effects of cumulative representations of war on the population.  
 
 
I. PAST WAR 
Throughout the interwar years, the French were constantly exposed to representations of a 
past war, a war in which victory had come at a high price. The aftermath of the Great War 
dominated post-war domestic and foreign policy, affected society at every level, permeated 
cultural production and was traumatically imprinted on a generation of survivors. Its 
representation kept memory alive, and was a powerful reminder of the consequences of war, 
fuelling a desperate desire to avoid another. Representations of past war also created the 
image of an ever-present enemy across the Rhine whose aggression made pacifism impossible 
to maintain. 
The sweetness of victory in 1918 soon turned sour as the population counted the cost of 
four years’ struggle: 1.3 million dead, over a million ‘permanent invalids’, and three million 
‘semi-invalids’; 900,000 buildings, 9,000 factories, 200 coal mines, 6,000 bridges and 2,400 
kilometres of railway destroyed; international debt and inflation; and a lasting demographic 
problem.
4
 Pain turned to anger, which the authorities sought to channel into official acts of 
commemoration. Such acts underlined the extent of loss, and thus represented war as 
devastation on a massive and pervasive scale. The ossuary at Verdun contained the bones of 
130,000 men, cemeteries stretched and multiplied, and monuments to the dead sprung up, as 
Jean-Marie de Busscher writes, like mushrooms after a storm.
5
 Over 38,000 such monuments 
brought loss into the heart of villages and towns, their long lists of names personalising death, 
and taking it deeper into home and family. While many depicted soldiers dying or dead, 
others featured women and children mourning their loved ones, bent double with grief.
6
 This 
was war that brought physical pain and suffering on the battlefield, and psychological pain 
and suffering for years to come. 
The First World War was a regular, if not constant, theme of films of the interwar period. 
Its popularity as a topic reflected the public mood. Early films such as J’accuse (‘I accuse’, 
1919) represented the horror of war; in one sequence, dead soldiers rose and marched towards 
the audience. It appeared at a time when criticism of the war began to surface. Popular culture 
of the 1920s, however, soon attempted to shake off disturbing memories; a popular song of 
the early twenties called ‘People need to laugh’ (On a besoin de rire) implored people to stop 
dwelling on the past. But by the end of the 1920s, war films regained popularity as ten-year 
anniversaries of battles and the deaths of Marshal Foch and Marshal Joffre dominated the 
news; the memory would not go away.
7
 Verdun, visions d’histoire (‘Verdun, Visions from 
History’, 1928), a documentary using battlefield footage, and All Quiet on the Western Front, 
the 1930 American adaptation of Erich Maria Remarque’s novel, were vivid evocations of 
soldiers’ experiences. Raymond Bernard’s harrowing Les Croix de Bois (‘Wooden Crosses’, 
1932), a critical and box office hit, followed a community of French soldiers, slowly reduced 
to one survivor.
8
 In the late thirties, the Great War was back in the cinema, with the success of 
Jean Renoir’s powerful pacifist film, La Grande Illusion (‘The Great Illusion’, 1937). 
However, war films of the late thirties began to move away from the pacifist critique of war, 
and swung back to celebrating the patriotism of the poilus and the nation at war. Films such as 
Passeurs d’hommes (‘Human Freight’, 1937), Sœurs d’armes (‘Sisters in Arms’, 1937) and 
Le Héros de la Marne (‘The Hero of the Marne’, 1938) rebuilt a picture of war as duty, where 
ordinary men and women were heroes. Films reflected and influenced public opinion, and the 
consistent success of First World War films – whether representing suffering, futility or 
heroism – maintained the memory of a past war that continued to haunt the present. The 
strong current of pacifism running through French society grew from the suffering borne out 
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of past war, developed and strengthened by representations of that war, projected onto a 
potential future conflict in which the scale and sacrifice would only increase. 
Civil defence literature from the late 1930s shows France attacked by air from all 
directions. La Petite Illustration, designed for classroom use, showed planes crossing the 
French border from Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and flying over the Normandy and Biscay 
coasts. The Manuel de la défense passive taught readers how to identify planes from different 
European countries.
9
 However, the legacy of past war had bequeathed France one certain 
enemy: Germany. Anxiety over the mistrusted eastern neighbour was strongly represented in 
feature films. Marianne Benteli notes that in all war and spy films of 1938 and 1939, 
Germany was the only enemy, and Germans were characterised as brutal barbarians who 
killed without reason.
10
 France was haunted by the fear of German rearmament, and the need 
to restrain German military potential dominated foreign policy. During the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference, French insistence on limiting German potential left them 
increasingly isolated. For foreign observers, French concerns were irrational, given Versailles 
restrictions, but the concern was for the future. The press confirmed these fears. After 
Poincaré announced talks on the early evacuation of the Rhineland at the Hague conference of 
1929, the French military used the press as a tool to mobilise opinion against the decision and 
gain support for defensive policies. The idea of a defenceless north-eastern border was 
expanded, and the threat greatly exaggerated.
11
 German propaganda infiltrated the Paris press, 
emphasising German strength. A feature placed by the German press agency Interpress in the 
high circulation Paris-Soir in 1938 focused on the unassailable German border defences.
12
 
German civil defence was examined by the Ministry of Air and the results published in 1938; 
it was found to be extremely well organised, well equipped and well trained, the population 
well prepared for war.
13
 The enemy, it seemed, was ready for revenge. 
From past conflict, the French understood the nature of modern war. The mobilisation of 
nearly half of the adult male population between 1914 and 1918 had brought war into every 
home, and death or mutilation to many. The Great War, its horror and aftermath, were 
continuously represented to the population in acts of commemoration, film and press. 
Reluctance to enter the next war, whose consequences would likely outstrip those of the last, 
was everywhere. But the representation of German strength and vengefulness made avoidance 
appear less possible. 
 
 
II. FUTURE WAR – ‘OFFICIAL’ REPRESENTATION 
It is in the representation of future war that the greatest contradiction arose. The French 
population was confronted with two conflicting images that created a deep confusion in its 
understanding of how to prepare for war, and ultimately how to behave when war broke out. 
The military leaders of the country put across an official representation of war as defence: 
France had a defensive military policy, and the population could rest assured that it was well 
defended. On the other hand, through almost all other channels, unofficial and some official, 
people received a representation of war as destruction, imminent and catastrophic. This was 
not a picture of borders defended, but of borders breached. How were these representations 
understood, and what effect did they have on the activity, or inactivity, of the population? 
French military thinking during the interwar years was characterised at the higher levels by 
defensive planning. Military leaders faced enormous pressure to avoid another war so 
offensive ideas were off the agenda. There was a tendency to look back rather than forward, 
and to develop and restructure ideas from the First World War instead of conceiving new 
forms of war. It was not that the French were reluctant to develop new technologies – indeed, 
they began World War Two with the most sophisticated medium tanks in Europe. 
14
 However, 
the Vice-President of the Superior War Council, Marshal Pétain, and his advisors fitted new 
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technology into a pre-existing model of warfare that was defined by mass firepower and 
covered defensive positions. Mobile tank warfare, as advocated by a few lower-ranking 
officers like Charles de Gaulle, was rejected.
15
 Unlike in Britain, where the Trenchard 
doctrine envisaged an independent, strategic air force as the prime offensive weapon of a 
great power, the French air force was designed to support the other services. Bombing civilian 
populations was morally abhorrent to French military leaders – it was not the way that a peace 
loving, lawful country fought a war. From 1921 to 1928 only two articles on bombing behind 
enemy frontlines were published in the journal Revue de l’Aéronautique Militaire. Although 
strategic bombing ideas of the Italian air expert Giulio Douhet gained currency during the 
1930s, it was by then too late to build a bomber force capable of rivalling the Luftwaffe.
16
 The 
Maginot line of defensive fortifications running from Luxemburg to Switzerland came to 
symbolise French defensive planning; more than a symbol, though, it was a means of 
channelling the expected attack through Belgium where the massed firepower of the army lay 
in wait. With man-made structures along the vulnerable border, and mountains and forest in 
the south-west and east, France appeared defended against invasion from land. 
Attack from air was a different matter, and again the thinking was defensive. A sizeable air 
force, it was thought, would deter the enemy. However, the French aeronautical industry was 
dominated by medium-sized firms, and a ‘policy of prototypes’ in the twenties had led to the 
proliferation of non-standardised models, and factories unsuited to mass production. Although 
the partial nationalisation of the air industry in 1936 helped increase production, it was not 
enough to create a force so formidable as to be preventative. To protect the population from 
an expected air attack, the French military promoted défense active and défense passive.
17
 It 
was through these concepts that the idea of war as defence was represented to the people. 
The country’s défense active consisted in the first instance of the fortifications and army 
installations that would prevent a ground invasion. The French population was told to have 
faith in the strength of the Maginot line, which became a ‘star’ of the newsreels. The Pathé-
Journal of 30 November 1938 took viewers on a tour of the fortifications, the commentary 
stating that ‘we can feel at safe in our homes’ because of its effectiveness. The Maginot line 
turned movie star in the 1937 spy film Double crime sur la Ligne Maginot (‘Double Crime on 
the Maginot Line’).18 The French army was a constant reassuring presence in the newsreels. 
Feature films exalting the army were popular, and were backed by government and military. 
Director Jean-Paul Paullin was permitted to film inside the elite military school of Saint-Cyr 
in production of his Trois de Saint-Cyr (‘Three from Saint-Cyr’) which followed the heroic 
fortunes of three graduates. The army assisted in the creation of realistic battle scenes and the 
premiere was attended by Prime Minister Edouard Daladier. Films extolling the wealth and 
loyalty of the French Empire and the strength of France’s diplomatic alliances represented an 
active form of defence off the battlefield, where international diplomacy backed up military 
strength.
19
 The support given to these films by high-ranking political and military figures 
demonstrated an active involvement in the creation of the public representation of a well-
defended France. 
The press contributed to an understanding of French security. The Dépêche de Toulouse 
reported that the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 was in fact a setback for Germany, 
and its regular defence feature vaunted the power of the French army.
20
 An article in Le 
Miroir du Monde described a new invention that used electric light beams and mirrors to 
provide ‘a very real protection against aerial bombardments’ by creating dazzling blankets of 
light over towns.
21
 Civil defence literature of the later 1930s made it clear that active defence 
measures were in place and would be mobilised immediately if borders were crossed by 
aircraft. The Manuel de la défense passive illustrated the many obstacles active defence would 
throw in the path of enemy planes before they reached their targets: they would be detected by 
look-out posts and listening stations, intercepted by fighter planes, shot down by anti-aircraft 
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guns, and hampered by mobile barrage balloons.
22
 France was defended on land borders, and 
prepared to combat attack by air. 
For all that it tried to demonstrate the strength of France’s active defences, and took pains 
to reassure the population, the government knew early on that ‘active defence, no matter how 
well developed, cannot completely protect the population and the functioning of public 
services’.23 The protection of the civilian population was under discussion throughout the 
interwar years, and a great deal of legislation was passed to establish the framework within 
which it would be organised.
24
 Perhaps the quantity of legislation made it difficult to 
implement, perhaps war did not yet seem close enough to worry about, or perhaps the pacifist 
spirit baulked at a military-style mobilisation of the public; the fact remains that, although by 
no means non-existent, French civil defence was not fully prepared when war did break out. It 
is telling that a report on the ‘Establishment of a plan of protection for the population’ in 
Brest is dated 29 September 1939, while Boulogne-Billancourt’s local civil defence 
complained in November 1939 that over half of the population lacked adequate bomb 
shelters.
25
 
The French population was faced with a contradiction: on one hand it was reassured that 
national leaders were defending it from attack. On the other, it also had to participate in its 
own defence in the knowledge that the active defence was insufficient. Défense active 
required a passive acquiescence on the part of the people: you can rest easy, you are defended. 
Défense passive required an active engagement in preparation and collective responsibility for 
ensuring survival: you must defend yourself and your community. In combination, they 
should have created a solid and unified defence. As Alexander Werth reports, however, 
during the Munich scare of September 1938, ‘Paris felt pretty helpless’. Lacking reinforced or 
gasproof shelters, gas masks, and sand, the population was also unconvinced by the adequacy 
of active defence: ‘Perhaps the ‘active defence’ would have chased away the enemy 
aeroplanes; but no one could tell.’26 The mixed messages of a country defended and a country 
vulnerable created confusion and mistrust, and permitted the intrusion of the unofficial image 
of future war, war as destruction, to gain currency. 
 
 
III. FUTURE WAR - ‘UNOFFICIAL’ REPRESENTATION 
When the Exposition Internationale des arts et techniques de la vie moderne (‘International 
Exhibition of the arts and techniques of modern life’) opened in Paris in May 1937, the 
dramatically opposed pavilions of the Soviet Union and Germany showcased the modernity 
and warlike virility of these nations. But of the thirty million visitors who flocked to the 
exhibition, many would also have entered the Spanish pavilion where Picasso’s Guernica 
depicted not ‘modern life’ but ‘modern death’.27 The enormous canvas, showing the horror of 
air war, was a graphic representation of the reality of modern warfare which the French had 
seen regularly on newsreels and in the colour photography of magazines like Paris-Match 
since the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in June 1936.
28
 The raid on Guernica in April 
1937 by the Condor Legion of the German air force assisted by Italian bombers, targeting too 
its undefended suburbs, followed devastating air raids on Madrid and Barcelona and brought 
home to the French population the air power of their eastern neighbour, and the ruthless 
targeting of civilian populations as a technique in modern warfare.
29
 The painting was seen as 
a vision of future horrors, Picasso the harbinger of a dreaded apocalypse.
30
 Representations of 
past war were traumatic, but representations of present wars – Spain, China, Abyssinia – 
predicted a future war that would not only be catastrophic, but which was imminent. 
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Catastrophic war 
How did people understand the components of the catastrophe that awaited them? It was 
made clear that it would arrive by air, reach into their homes, and would comprise explosive 
bombs, fire and, perhaps most terrifyingly, poison gas. The representation of catastrophe in 
press, film and advertising was constantly reinforced by the work of civil defence 
organisations, striving to prepare a passive defence to complement the active defence 
provided by the military. 
Ordinary French people may not have been abreast of technological developments in 
aircraft design or explosives, but, as images of present wars showed, the capacity to destroy 
by air had increased since the last war. The development of the French air force featured in 
newsreels where audiences saw new French planes in production and in flight.
31
 Armed with 
the knowledge that the German air force was growing and that a French air force was likewise 
expanding, the expectation of air attack was evident. Civil defence literature of the later 1930s 
demonstrated the increased capacity of contemporary bombers. The first page of La Petite 
Illustration’s civil defence issue for secondary schools showed a map of France with planes 
attacking from all sides, no département out of reach.
32
 Public information brochures 
compared capacity in 1918 with present capacity, and emphasised the increased speed, range 
and altitude of new aircraft.
33
 The Manuel de la défense passive noted that during the whole 
of the last war, only 37 enemy planes reached Paris, between them dropping 303 bombs 
totalling 11.5 tonnes; today the enemy could send hundreds of planes to Paris and drop 
hundreds of tonnes of bombs in a single night. 
The clearest manifestation of the bombers’ power was in the destruction of buildings by 
explosion. Images of apartment buildings ripped apart in Barcelona and Madrid, possessions 
strewn and smouldering in the rubble, confronted the French in the news and in civil defence 
brochures.
34
 Future war was not confined to well-defined battlegrounds, but entered homes – 
via the roof. This preoccupation with protecting one’s home and family is reflected in 
commercial activities of the period. Insurance companies began to offer, for an increased 
premium, special protection against the effects of war, which included bombardment.
35
 
Companies manufacturing air raid shelters played on the fear of being crushed. Le Béton 
Industriel advertised its conical shelter capable of withstanding a 50 kilogram bomb:  
 
If it was tomorrow, would you be ready? You’re thinking straight away of your well-
built cellar whose walls are over 40 centimetres thick. An illusion of security! What 
would you do if you were trapped in the cellar as the building above collapsed, 
especially if you have children?
36
 
 
Civil defence literature dwelt on explosives, devoting a lot of space to their effects and 
how to avoid them.
37
 Louise Weiss, who founded a propaganda centre in Paris to educate the 
public in civil defence, deplored official civil defence publications, although her centre’s 
efforts, while informative, clearly demonstrated the impact of war on the home. Her training 
stands at the Salon d’Aéronautique in 1938 and at the ‘Exhibition of Household Arts’ 
(Exposition des arts ménagers), displayed a model house completely destroyed by bombs – 
although the safety-conscious residents had survived. Weiss estimated that her organisation 
taught around 500,000 women how to protect their homes; at the same time, those 500,000 
women were now fully alerted to future war’s destructive potential.38 
The threat of incendiary bombs fuelled images of destruction by fire, and fire fighting was 
a central preoccupation of civil defence education. The Manuel de la défense passive 
highlighted the rapid spread of fire: 
 
You can put out a fire in the first minute with a glass of water, in the second minute with 
a bucket of water, and in the third minute with a tonne of water.
39
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The leaflet Français pour votre sauvegarde illustrated the correct way to spray water at an 
incendiary bomb, and most leaflets gave first aid instruction for burns.
40
 The imminent threat 
of fire was brought home to owners of apartments in Boulogne-Billancourt when sand was 
distributed in August 1938.
41
 Advertising once more caught hold of a deepening fear. The 
manufacturer Stop-Fire
42
 represented the dangers of being without one of its extinguishers: 
 
Cries of terror! A clamour of fear! Then the sad cortège, unemployment, ruin, perhaps a 
terrible death. Against the scourge of fire, a certain remedy: the Stop-Fire extinguisher.
43
 
 
Equally the Sans Rivale ladder promised a quick escape from a bombed building, the 
picture showing bombers overhead, flames and smoke billowing from upper storeys: ‘There 
are many ways to put out a fire,’ read the text, ‘but only one fast means of escape’.44 The next 
war would bring collapse and explosion, and if you survived that, it was entirely possible that 
your house would be burnt down, and you with it. 
The final component of future war, and possibly the most frighteningly represented, was 
poison gas. The use of poison gas had been outlawed at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, 
although this was violated by both sides during World War One. Its potential provoked much 
discussion between the wars, in military circles and elsewhere. Raymond Grenouillet, a 
specialist in chemical weapons, wrote in 1928 that ‘future war will be an unlimited war 
between whole nations and all means available will be used to secure victory’. He added 
several years later the Great War was ‘a modest preface’ to the chemical war that lay ahead.45 
By the time of his second article, public awareness had grown. The International Red Cross 
set up a documentation centre on airborne chemical warfare in 1929, and had a regular feature 
on the subject in its journal.
46
 Mysyrowicz cites a spate of novels in the early 1930s set in the 
aftermath of a chemical apocalypse, ‘mediocre’ novels, but catering to public interest 
nonetheless.
47
 Poison gas represented the catastrophe to end all catastrophes, ‘capable of 
destroying all forms of life in a big city like Paris in just a few minutes’.48 Capable, it 
appeared, of bringing about the end of civilisation.  
The reaction to the threat of poison gas was loud, and precautions caused as much worry as 
the threat. In 1934, the magazine Je sais tout ran a feature entitled ‘Gas alert! We’re not 
ready’, its cover showing a person in full protective clothing carrying the limp form of a little 
girl. It categorically stated that ‘bombs are going to fall on Paris’, and lamented the 
unprepared state of the capital to deal with gas attack; no gasproofed shelters, too few masks, 
no disinfection services. What fate awaited gassed Parisians? 
 
You cry, you cough, you suffocate, you burn, fall unconscious, and, if you don’t die on 
the spot, you will have serious health problems and a short, unhappy life.
49
 
 
Yet again, products were on the market, such as the Rideau Store Périnel, a ‘curtain’ for 
doors and windows that created a ‘hermetically sealed gasproof shelter’.50 Civil defence 
literature dwelt on different types of gas and their effects. Over a quarter of La Petite 
Ilustration’s issue for schools concerned gas, teaching students and teachers to walk away 
from the wind in a gas cloud, or how to handle contaminated clothes.
51
 Readers learnt to 
identify gases by smell – garlic, mustard, geranium – and the horrible effects each had on the 
body.
52
 The main protection against gas was the gas mask, which, when pictured, presented a 
frightening, dehumanised face. The poor provision of gas masks caused anxiety in France 
from the mid-thirties: in 1935 a small riot erupted outside a provincial supplier, which had to 
be suppressed by police.
53
 Louise Weiss was extremely concerned about the government’s 
instructions for ‘make-your-own’ masks, the effectiveness of which she doubted.54 In 1939, 
the weekly newpaper Le cri du people published an exposé of the ‘gas mask scandal’, under 
the headline ‘Warning, Parisians! Your wives and children will be massacred while you 
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defend your country!’ The masks on sale, it claimed, were ‘worthless’, and would do nothing 
to prevent a ‘long, atrocious death’.55 Articles such as this, accurate or otherwise, politically 
motivated or simply hysterical, nonetheless reinforced that there appeared to be no protection 
against gas, the catastrophic weapon par excellence. 
The French population was bombarded with representations of future war as imminent 
future catastrophe. Crushed, burnt or poisoned, the threat remained, and grew. In order to 
teach people to protect themselves, civil defence education had to explain graphically the 
scope and scale of the threat. It thus gave credence to unofficial representations of future war 
and ‘lent authority to the general jitters’.56 
 
Imminent war 
Eugen Weber writes that after 1930, ‘catastrophe was in the air’57 and this idea is certainly 
echoed in the diary of the writer Julien Green, resident in Paris. In 1930 he had resigned 
himself ‘to living in the expectation of catastrophe’; in 1932 he describes a Parisian 
preoccupation ‘which consists of predicting the war for the end of the week’, and the 
following year he feared the outbreak of war ‘at any minute’.58 The tension in international 
and domestic politics fuelled the feeling of imminence, echoed in other media. 
Apprehension over German rearmament and the likelihood of revenge mounted during the 
1930s. The World Disarmament Conference at Geneva from February 1932 was a failure for 
French hopes of containing Germany. The principle of ‘equality of right’ of armament, 
through all countries disarming or German rearmament, was agreed. France knew that even if 
Germany rearmed to the same level, it would dominate because of its industrial and 
demographic strength. The following March, figures of the increased German military budget 
were published, and later that year the French ambassador in Berlin reported that Hitler was 
having difficulty housing all his new troops. By March 1935, Hitler had discarded all pretence 
of observing Versailles conditions: a peacetime army of 550,000 men was authorised, and the 
German air force assigned official status.
59
 The German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 
March 1936 brought war a leap closer. Alexander Werth, touring France in April, noted in 
Strasbourg that there was ‘something of a panic’, while in Nancy the ‘feeling of the ever-
present German menace’ was now ‘stronger than ever’.60 
The escalation of German strength was not directly represented to the people, and news, 
radio and newsreels were subject to increasing censorship. From 1936, newsreel producers 
had to seek approval for the content of their films in advance. Knowledge would lead to 
questioning, which neither government nor military wanted. As Anthony Adamthwaite 
comments, any lack of interest in foreign affairs among the French population arose from a 
deliberate attempt to deprive it of information.
61
 
Nevertheless, censorship could not remove representations of imminent war entirely. 
Domestic politics mobilised the threat of war to discourage support for opponents. After the 
formation of the Front Commun in 1933, which aimed to unite progressive leftist opinion
62
, 
the Right issued posters dramatically illustrating what support for the Left would bring. One 
showed a stream of Nazi bombers dropping bombs on Paris, another a squadron of bombers 
crossing the Rhine.
63
 France, the posters suggested, was on the very brink of war. Support for 
the Left would tip the balance, putting responsibility into voters’ hands. Omer Bartov 
suggests that as the Right was never explicit about how it could prevent armed conflict, this 
representation of war had ‘a devastating effect on morale’.64 Support the Left or support the 
Right: either would precipitate war, according to the propaganda. 
The Munich crisis of September 1938 did much to accelerate the expectation of war. The 
Pathé-Journal of 28 September 1938 entitled ‘Serious times’ (‘Heures graves’) reinforced the 
feeling of crisis with a dramatically solemn representation of the situation. A week later the 
newsreel was dedicated to the resolution of the crisis, yet by the following week, Munich only 
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received a few seconds’ attention.65 If the crisis passed so quickly in the newsreels, what 
accounted for the increasing edginess after Munich? Marie-Genevièvre Chevignard and 
Nicole Faure have noted that during and after the Munich crisis war crept subtly into the 
women’s press. The mass-circulation magazine Confidences encouraged couples to think 
about the impending separation:  
 
Gentlemen, have you ever thought of what would happen if you disappeared abruptly? 
Is your wife up to date with your business affairs, your finances, your plans?
 66
 
 
War had not broken up the family – yet. Once again war was represented as reaching into 
the home, destroying not just bricks and mortar, but relationships too. There is an element of 
urgency about the article, as though the need to prepare for departure had grown. Perhaps the 
dark turn in French feature films post-Munich shows a shift of opinion. While films such as 
Hôtel du Nord, La bête humaine, Le jour se lève and Le règle du jeu did not deal explicitly 
with war, each represented a world where despair and defeat reigned.
67
 In popular culture, as 
with news, explicit representation of the oncoming war was not common, but the increasing 
tension could be felt. 
Practice civil defence exercises indicated that war was imminent. Mock emergencies to test 
the response of civil defence teams took place in Brest in March 1938. If people wanted a 
representation of what future war would be like, they needed only to step outside. On 4 March 
1938, a full-scale air attack was simulated, with planes from the French navy posing as enemy 
bombers, others as defensive fighters. A practice blackout took place on 16 March, and in 
June 1938, an exercise in coping with gas drew a crowd of onlookers. In October air raid 
precautions were published in the press for readers to ‘cut out and keep’.68 The conclusion to 
draw was that they would soon be needed. In December 1938, the municipal authorities of 
Boulogne-Billancourt published a map of the town divided into 96 civil defence segments and 
a list of shelters.
69
 There was also a spate of publishing on civil defence issues, some for 
public information and some aimed at the professionals who would be required to participate. 
This sudden flurry of civil defence activity towards the end of the decade showed that it 
would soon be necessary to put plans into practice. 
By the end of the decade, France was on edge. The frenzied evacuation of Paris during the 
‘scare days’ of September 1938 attests to the perceived imminence of attack. Alexander 
Werth describes the race to leave the city, the rising prices of hotels on escape routes and a 
rush on trunks and suitcases. Children were sent to the country, or told by the authorities not 
to return from their summer holidays. Werth himself was drawn into the panic, withdrawing 
his savings and stocking up on tobacco.
70
 The French had spent twenty years dealing with 
images of past war, present war and future war, and, while the government tried to prevent 
panic (and criticism) through censorship, and the military urged trust in its defensive policy, 
the expectation of catastrophe continued to grow. The population was educated into an 
understanding of the shape and details of this catastrophe, and, as the 1930s passed, the 
question was not if it would happen, but when – and the answer appeared to be now. 
 
 
IV. IMPACT 
The cumulative effect of conflicting representations of war on French people was itself 
contradictory. War would either be withheld by defensive policies or would fall heavily on 
the civilian population. In either circumstance, there seemed little that could be done. In that 
light, the demands of civil defence seemed pointless, and were greeted in many cases with a 
lack of interest or derision. Alexander Werth’s friend David thought that gas masks were ‘a 
lot of British eyewash’. In his opinion, and no doubt he was not alone, ‘you couldn’t swamp 
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the whole of Paris with gas’.71 When Louise Weiss’s propaganda centre held demonstrations 
in hotels and factories, they persevered despite ‘the mockery as we put on our masks and 
protective clothing’.72 When the exercise in dealing with a gas attack took place in Brest, 
many of the large crowd could not take it seriously. The oilskin-clad firemen were ‘a big hit’ 
with onlookers, until more elaborately dressed disinfection teams began their work, ‘to the 
great joy of the curious’.73 Either people did not believe the catastrophic scaremongering or 
felt that civil defence could wait. The various representations of war led in this case to lack of 
interest, and through that to inactivity in preparing for war. 
Government intervention in media output acted to anaesthetise public opinion, depriving 
people of information and replacing it with platitudes of security and the mundanities of 
celebrity, sport, popular music, quizzes and serials. The state controlled radio programming 
and did not permit controversial issues to be discussed in cinema newsreels.
74
 Popular music 
urged people to laugh away their worries, a foxtrot of 1935 asking ‘Why get worked up about 
nothing?’ (Pourquoi se biler pour rien?). While seeing war represented in all its horrors, the 
idea of accepting the status quo also persisted. After all, as a song from 1936 put it, ‘It’s better 
than catching scarlet fever’ (Ça va mieux que d’attraper la scarletine) – things could have 
been worse.
75
 Unfortunately, when things did get worse, people were still being told to forget 
their problems. The women’s press encouraged readers to forget their troubles, a Marie-
Claire horoscope of February 1939 reassuring them that ‘We will not have a war with our 
neighbours’, and later that year a story in Confidences told readers ‘sing, dance, even if you 
don’t really feel like it’.76 Henri de Montherlant wrote that although the threat of war was 
hanging over the country, the French chose instead to ‘bury their heads in the sand’.77 Again, 
this attitude led to inactivity in preparing for an unwanted war. 
Yet there was clearly also mounting fear and tension. War was a constant topic of 
conversation, and dominated political discourse. Whether dwelling on past horrors, looking 
apprehensively at a vengeful neighbour, putting faith in a policy of defence or falling prey to 
representations of imminent catastrophe, France was afraid and confused. For an elderly 
Parisian in 1936, the fear became too much and he attempted suicide, believing an air raid 
practice to be the real thing.
78
 War seemed increasingly certain, and the panic of the ‘scare 
days’ of the Munich crisis foreshadowed the reaction in 1939 when war did break out. On that 
day, Louise Weiss records the telephone calls to her propaganda centre: ‘What’s your advice? 
Does wind disperse a gas cloud? Is my cellar bombproof?’79 Many Parisian children were 
evacuated, some finding themselves in villages unprepared to shelter them.
80
 As the Phoney 
War progressed, life returned, in relief, to normal; it seemed that the threat had been 
exaggerated. Yet when the French army was defeated in May 1940, and the Germans invaded, 
people understood that the defensive policy which had long been represented as a bulwark 
against German aggression had failed. They were left, then, with the other representation of 
war, the expectation of catastrophe. Pursued by that thought, between eight and ten million 
took to the roads, desperate to escape the danger that they had anticipated for so many years. 
In 1934 Eugène Dabit wrote that the stupidity of certain men would soon lead to ‘the most 
infamous and terrible of all wars’. The nightmare of expectation gave way to the nightmare of 
war, and for French people living in places that, over the four years following the armistice, 
became targets for the RAF and the US Air Force, the catastrophic raids, heavier than 
imagined, surpassed (in every respect but poison gas) their pre-war representation. ‘They are 
leading us there gently’, wrote Dabit, ‘in confusion and lies’.81 Censored information, 
misplaced faith, inactivity, bewilderment and fear meant that France, despite twenty years of 
constant representations, did not know how to face war when it struck French soil in 1940. 
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